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Type, Personalisation and Depersonalisation 
in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians
Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) recounts the rebellion of  the Magistrate of  an Empire 
frontier outpost against the torture inflicted on those the Imperial administration which 
employs him considers as “barbarians.” The first-person narration is a strategy enabling 
the author to personalize the Magistrate whose name he never reveals, above all because through 
it we are allowed to witness the workings of  conscience. The novel is a drama of  the opposition 
between justice and law, and of  what happens when men who are supposed to uphold the law in 
fact neglect justice and abuse their power, themselves becoming worse than “barbarians.” Within 
this complex moral and ethical framework the essay at hand proposes to explore the modalities 
of  personhood as established by Coetzee, and its limits.
J.M. Coetzee summed up Waiting for the Barbarians, six years after the publication 
of  the novel, by saying that it was “about the impact of  the torture chamber on the 
life of  a man of  conscience” (Doubling the Point 363).1 The first part of  the statement 
stresses state oppression; the second part, conscience and human being. The unna-
med Magistrate, the novel’s main character, is then a “man of  conscience.” He is, as a 
man of  conscience, a type, and that seems to be enough for Coetzee. His character’s 
conscience, in the author’s eyes, defines him sufficiently for him to be denied a name. 
He is at the same time a man of  justice, a man of  the law. He describes himself  as just 
“another grey-haired servant of  Empire” (Waiting for the Barbarians 16). He does not see 
himself  as anyone special: “I am a country magistrate […], serving out my days on this 
lazy frontier, waiting to retire […]. I have not asked for more than a quiet life in quiet 
times” (Waiting 8). Ironically, the arrival at the Magistrate’s Imperial frontier town of  
state police officer Colonel Joll, and later Warrant Officer Mandel, brings to an end the 
Magistrate’s “quiet life in quiet times” and the rule of  law it is his – and, supposedly, 
their – very function to ensure. 
In order to contextualize the present perspective, it is worth pointing out that al-
though there are no direct references to the notions of  type and person in Waiting for 
the Barbarians, Coetzee does refer to type in two later novels. In The Master of  Petersburg, 
the main character, Dostoyevsky, has an affair with Anna, the landlady of  the writer’s 
deceased son, Pavel: “He imagines her as she lies […] beside her daughter, her eyes 
open and glistening. She belongs, he realizes for the first time, to a type he has never 
written into his books” (The Master of  Petersburg 133). One type of  woman, the one 
Dostoyevsky is used to, has sensations which are intense but “of  the surface,” whereas 
Anna’s “type” has sensations “deep within their bodies” (Master 133). From then on, he 
desires this quality as found in this “type” of  woman. Teaching The Prelude, the English 
professor David Lurie, narrator and protagonist of  Disgrace, tries to explain to his class 
why Wordsworth’s discovery of  Mont Blanc is disappointing to the poet. It is due to 
1. An early version of  this article was delivered as a seminar paper at Michael F. Zimmermann’s Aesthesis conference 
on “Type and Person” at Eichstadt Catholic University, in Germany, in July 2014. The author wishes to thank Professor 
Zimmermann for his inspiration and hospitality on that occasion. Thanks, too, to the editor, Claire Omhovère, and to 
the two anonymous peer reviewers for their suggestions for improvement.
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the discrepancy between the idea the poet has formed of  the mountain and its reality. 
Lurie tries to explain this discrepancy by drawing an analogy based on the experience 
of  being in love: “Do you truly wish to see the beloved in the cold clarity of  the visual 
apparatus? It may be in your better interest to throw a veil over the gaze, so as to keep 
her alive in her archetypal, goddesslike form” (Disgrace 22). Lurie goes on to use the 
phrase “the great archetypes of  the imagination” and, just before, in connection with 
the Wordsworth poem, “the great archetypes of  the mind, pure ideas” (Disgrace 22-3). 
The word “idea” alludes to the Platonic forms which were a staple of  English Roman-
tic poetry. Coetzee said of  Waiting for the Barbarians: “Why does one choose the side of  
justice when it is not in one’s material interest to do so? The Magistrate gives the rather 
Platonic answer: because we are born with the idea of  justice” (Doubling 394).2 While 
wrestling with the problem of  evil in various forms in his writing, Coetzee seems to be 
displaying here a strong bias in favour of  the humanist idea that all human beings are 
basically good, all the more notable in a writer coming from a country whose history 
has been so fraught with injustice. 
The notion of  human beings being born with the idea of  justice calls to mind Rous-
seau’s definition of  conscience: conscience is an innate principle of  justice and virtue, 
which enables us to judge our own actions and those of  others as good or evil (cf. Blay’s 
entry on conscience). The Magistrate is a type, to the extent that he is a man whose 
function it is in the plot of  the novel to embody and to represent the idea of  justice. 
The Magistrate as person is not merely, or rather not primarily, the sum of  the different 
elements which make up his personality – his passionate attempt to discover or reach 
the essence of  the barbarian girl, his interest in archaeology. Rather he manifests the 
necessity for justice, if  it is to have any reality or density at all, to be incarnated in the 
fallible warp and weft of  human being. 
At this point one might apply a religious perspective. Among other possible refe-
rences to this domain, the language with which the Magistrate describes the treatment 
the Empire’s officers inflict on him inevitably recalls the Passion: “I have already died 
one death, on that tree” (Waiting 125). In its statement of  charges against the Magistrate, 
the Empire accuses him of  consorting with a “streetwoman” (83), a term suggestive 
of  prostitution. The Magistrate “anoint[s] [the girl] with exotic oils” (56; also 135, “my 
perfumes and oils”), starting with her feet, in what he repeatedly calls a “ritual” (for 
example 41). Such a cluster of  Biblical allusions or even pattern of  Biblical motifs hints 
at the possibility of  our seeing the Magistrate as a Christ figure, and the barbarian girl, 
mutatis mutandis, as an avatar of  Mary Magdalene (John 12:3: Mary “anoint[s] Jesus’ feet” 
with “expensive perfume”). Conversely the Magistrate is a Magdalene anointing the 
feet of  the barbarian girl as Christ figure. They are both Christ figures crucified by the 
Empire: the barbarian girl is an innocent, tortured without trial, the magistrate is hung 
on the tree for his defence of  justice.
Mask and Identity
In the first pages of  the novel, the Imperial army has taken some “barbarians” prisoner. 
As Colonel Joll’s first conversation with the Magistrate reveals, the Colonel has already 
2. One might compare this statement with one made by Dostoyevsky to another character, Nechaev, in The Master 
of  Petersburg: “You were born with the spirit of  justice in you” (Master 183).
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judged the prisoners – an old man and his nephew, a young boy – as guilty of  belon-
ging to a larger raiding party, though the Colonel lacks evidence of  this and the army 
have captured the prisoners on their own. The Empire, then, refuses to acknowledge 
the personhood of  the barbarians, if  Hegel’s idea that personhood involves giving the 
individual a legal dimension, according to abstract law; Hegel’s idea of  the person cor-
responds to that to be found in ancient and medieval philosophy, wherein the person is 
a subject of  right and obligation in the moral and legal order (cf. Blay on “person”). The 
question of  conscience intervenes when the first-person narrator, the Magistrate, uses 
the legal verb to plead: “I grow conscious that I am pleading for [the prisoners]” (4). 
The Magistrate is distinctly conscious of  his conscience, and his “growing conscious” 
is part of  the process of  his becoming a person. He uses the legal verb though his 
professional role is not to plead for, or against, the accused, but to mete out justice. He 
tells the Colonel that the prisoners have no reason to be lying when they protest their 
innocence. Again, when the Magistrate tries to persuade himself  he has not heard the 
screams of  pain coming from the room where the Colonel interrogates the prisoners, 
he tries to justify to himself  his hearing nothing, his moral deafness: “I begin to plead 
my own cause” (5); again the Magistrate expresses himself  in specifically legal language 
(through the use of  the verb to plead, and through one meaning of  the noun “cause,” 
meaning an individual’s case offered at law), as though he were almost wholly identi-
fiable with his professional function. 
The narrative has now established the existence of  two “causes,” the barbarians’ 
and the Magistrate’s, as though their causes, if  not they themselves, were somehow 
interdependent. The Magistrate’s and the barbarians’ fate, along with, possibly, their 
very respective identities, have become lexically entwined, and perhaps existentially so. 
At the same time, the Magistrate tries to turn a deaf  ear to his own moral deafness. It is 
an attempt to stifle his conscience, but that attempt is useless – he pleads his own cause 
because he knows he has behaved unethically by letting the Colonel take the prisoners 
away for questioning so easily. This weighs on his conscience. It is as though his person-
hood, dependent on his conscience, were at once affirmed and denied.
Moreover, since Coetzee intended the Magistrate – who has no name to individua-
lize him, despite being an individualized character in many other respects – to be “a man 
of  conscience,” he is more of  a type than a person. The Magistrate is the type, or at least 
a type, of  the conscientious objector. But every conscientious objector is different: it is 
his very conscientious objection that makes him most truly a person, that singularizes 
him. In specific relation to conscience, Geoffrey Hill reflected on the concept of  “in-
trinsic value” (cf. Collected Critical Writings 465-77). Hill lays down an integrated vision of  
intrinsic value in which opposites are somehow complementary and not only antagonis-
tic: “the intrinsic value of  our self-realization in and through conscience [stems] directly 
from the implicated nature of  our strength and frailty.” Hill takes the verbal adjective 
“implicated” from a phrase of  John Henry Newman’s quoted a few lines before: “the 
human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity” (Collected Critical Writings 
475). This is Newman’s “phrase for the inheritance of  Original Sin,” as Hill calls it (Col-
lected Critical Writings 475). Although Coetzee does not use the term “sin” in Waiting for 
the Barbarians, he does go out of  his way to suggest that it underpins the Magistrate’s 
own worldview: “we are fallen creatures” (Waiting 139).
26
Hill’s anthropology, while theologically contextualized, is founded upon the primacy 
of  conscience, as a means to what he calls “self-realization.” So if  we apply this line of  
reasoning to the Magistrate, we can assert that, because of  his conscience, and in spite 
or because of  his moral frailty, the Magistrate is a person, a “self.” “Ironically, the na-
meless Magistrate remains an absence throughout the novel,” Hania Nashef  has argued, 
going on to say, “The jargon which has […] ruled his life, the language through which 
he has spoken, has left him empty” (Politics of  Humiliation 10). Yet this is an incomplete 
reading of  the Magistrate rather than an untrue one. Waiting for the Barbarians is the 
story of  a man whose conscience comes into conflict with the régime which governs 
him (and of  which he is a part). The régime’s many disputes with the Magistrate and 
the various punishments that it metes out to him go to show that the Magistrate is to 
Joll, Mandel and the other officers an awkward presence, a thorn in the Empire’s side, 
despite his age and apparent ineffectuality. 
The Magistrate’s narrative shows him to have a powerful reflexivity, an indestruc-
tible self-awareness. This is arguably and precisely what the other “servants of  Empire” 
in the novel – Joll, Mandel, the warrant officer – do not have. The Magistrate, then, 
is not exactly an absence in himself  but rather a person who happens to be without 
self-importance, an ageing civil servant who wants only a quiet life and the freedom to 
devote himself  to his sensual pleasures and few harmless hobbies. He has not spent his 
professional life waiting for the barbarians, or waiting for anyone or anything – until 
the barbarians arrive in the shape of  the state police who represent his employer, the 
Empire, and wield authority over him. Coetzee has made the point that the Magistrate’s 
thinking cannot be ascribed to him alone, since his thoughts represent “voices of  au-
thority speaking through him” (White Writing 133). Even if  for this reason his person-
hood is incomplete (on condition that one accepts Coetzee’s own interpretation of  
his character), it is the coming of  the barbarians – both Colonel Joll and the barbarian 
prisoners – which makes him a person, or more fully a person. The more he resists the 
state police by defending the barbarians, the more they acknowledge him, the more he 
follows the dictates of  his conscience, the more he becomes a person. He has his own 
personal authority deriving not from his Magistrature or his “smooth patrician talk” 
(77), as he knows full well, showing no surprise at Mandel’s scornful attitude towards 
him, but from his ethical and moral standpoint that in turn springs from his conscience. 
To the Magistrate, Colonel Joll’s shades are his main defining feature. They make 
him a source of  fascination for the Magistrate and the others at the outpost. They 
function as a mask, and the Colonel seems to be nothing but his persona: no wonder 
the Magistrate associates both him and warrant officer Mandel spontaneously with the 
theatre. The question of  identity becomes complex once the word “mask” itself  enters 
the Magistrate’s narrative. He approaches the boy whom the old man, now dead – pre-
sumably at the Colonel’s hands – brought with him for medical treatment. The boy pulls 
back from the Magistrate whose one desire is to comfort and reassure him: doubling his 
point, Coetzee writes: “It has not escaped me that an interrogator can wear two masks, 
speak with two voices, one harsh, one seductive” (7). The boy does not then see the Ma-
gistrate and the Colonel as two different persons, or even as persons at all. He sees them 
as two faces of  a single type: the interrogator. Hence identity remains undifferentiated, 
and in a sense dependent on the observer as opposed to the subject himself. There are 
other unsettling parallels between the Magistrate and Joll. Joll’s face is “masked by two 
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black glassy insect eyes from which there comes no reciprocal gaze” (44). When the 
Magistrate tries to look Joll in the eye, he only sees himself  reflected back.
If  there is nevertheless a certain diffuseness attaching to the identity of  the Magis-
trate, it is perhaps because he feels “locked in a configuration in which events are not 
themselves but stand for other things” (38). Referentiality and signification become 
unstable, blurred – something that no totalitarian state will tolerate – including human 
identity itself. Moreover, as the Magistrate becomes more and more ostracized by the 
state police, and following that by the broader society of  townspeople, a certain inter-
changeability enters the course of  events. We may consider such interchangeability from 
the point of  view of  identity: “A man sits at my desk in the office behind the cour-
troom” (76), and later, “Colonel Joll sits behind the desk in my office” (110). Although 
the idea here is that of  replaceability rather than identity, the Magistrate’s replacement 
by servants of  the state depicted as evil confirms the Magistrate’s intuition when he 
approaches the boy: that to be a servant of  the state is to be evil, whoever you are. To 
serve the state means to be evil, or to wear the mask of  evil, which seems to be the same 
thing. The Magistrate is “invisible behind the glass” of  his window (90), just as Joll is 
invisible behind his shades. This might suggest that the Magistrate’s moral standpoint is 
thus not quite clear, and indeed he often questions his own motives.
When Colonel Joll appears for the last time in the novel, his party defeated by the 
barbarians, he is no longer wearing his sunglasses, his mask. This cannot simply be be-
cause it is night-time when he and his party pull into the frontier town, since when he 
tortures the barbarian girl and the other prisoners at the start of  the plot, it is at night. 
But paradoxically, without his sunglasses he is more insubstantial than ever. To the 
Magistrate looking at Joll through his carriage window, he is just a “faint blur against 
the blackness” (146). The full sentence reads: “I stare through the window at the faint 
blur against the blackness that is Colonel Joll.” The sentence structure is such that one 
might almost read the end of  the sentence as “the blackness that is Colonel Joll”: Joll 
is reduced to the blackness of  the sunglasses he has for once taken off  (or lost in the 
struggle against the barbarians). This “blackness” can perhaps stand as the obverse of  
the “whiteness” (9) of  the snow always associated with the barbarian girl in the Magis-
trate’s dream. Empire has somehow stripped both Joll and the barbarian girl of  their 
own identities.
The word “mask” recurs in the Magistrate’s depiction of  the first man he finds sit-
ting at his desk: “When he looks at me, as he will in a moment, he will look from behind 
that handsome immobile face and through those clear eyes as an actor looks from 
behind a mask” (77). He is a perfect type “with regular teeth and lovely blue eyes,” the 
perfect Aryan male. He is not merely or even primarily a pure racial type: he is a pure 
product of  Empire. Bereft of  personality, he is all mask, all surface.
The Intolerable Other
The Magistrate assumes the barbarian girl whom the Magistrate takes in thinks of  
Joll as “your friend with the black eyes” (135). The girl herself  has “black eyes” (26). 
The Colonel’s black eyes are, in fact, his sunglasses, which act as his mask. Since Joll 
tortured her around the face and eyes, the girl cannot look another person in the eye. 
Whenever the Magistrate tries to look her in the eye, she gazes blankly beyond him. Joll 
has reproduced in the girl his own inability to return another person’s gaze. By torturing 
28
her around the eyes, he has transformed her into a version of  himself  – in her case, a 
kind of  shadow version of  himself. Either he has tortured her in this way because he 
has seen in her a kind of  barbarianism which he knows only too well is within himself; 
or, conversely, because totalitarianism cannot tolerate the Other, and must somehow re-
plicate itself  mimetically. To the girl, Joll’s mask is his face, since his dark glasses seem to 
her to be his eyes. It is as though his mask were his reality. He has no personal identity. 
As for the girl’s blank gaze, it may stand for the side of  her that is unknowable both 
to Joll and to the Magistrate, however much each of  them in his own way may probe 
her. In the Magistrate’s recurrent dream of  the children playing in the snow, he always 
pictures the girl – if  her it is – as blank-faced, faceless even: “The face I see is blank, fea-
tureless […] it is not a face at all” (Waiting 37). Because she has no face, she has no mask. 
In this respect the girl is all reality. The Empire is all pretence, all theatre; the barbarian 
girl is all reality, she has no depth because she has no surface (no mask), she is all one. 
The Empire cannot stand her reality, nor that of  the Other as a group, the barbarians.
Who exactly is the barbarian girl? What makes this question hard for the reader to 
answer is the fact that because of  the first-person narrative technique, the reader can 
only encounter her through the narrator’s testimony. The latter is not entirely subjective, 
and conditioned by the fact that, when all is said and done, the relationship between the 
Magistrate and the barbarian girl is a power relationship in which one of  the two part-
ners to that relationship holds all the power, and the other one none. The problem is 
confounded not only by the sympathy which draws the Magistrate to the girl in the first 
place, but also by his habit of  speculation and sympathetic identification.3 He constantly 
tries to understand her feelings and to see himself  as he thinks she might see him.4 That 
said, the girl is an enigma to the Magistrate not inherently because she is a barbarian 
or because they do not speak each other’s language – they manage to communicate 
rudimentarily in the same language – but because she has been tortured behind closed 
doors, and has seen her father tortured and killed. The impact on her is to damage if  
not alter her identity: “Is it she I want or the traces of  a history her body bears?” (64). 
Throughout the text, the Magistrate’s terms, especially for people, are constantly syno-
nymous, this multinominal approach reflecting shifting perceptions on the Magistrate’s 
part. Thus the unnamed girl is a “barbarian prisoner” (47), “a beggar, a fatherless child” 
(56), “a stranger, a visitor from strange parts”;5 and the Magistrate records – indeed 
insists on – his “freedom to make of  the girl whatever I felt like, wife or concubine or 
daughter or slave or all at once or none” (78). The relationship the Magistrate has with 
her also colours her identity as outsiders perceive it: to them, she is “the old man’s slut” 
(63). At the heart of  the Magistrate’s relationship with the girl is the massage ritual by 
which the girl, in Grant Hamilton’s words, “ceases to be a simple determined function 
in the territorial assemblage of  the Magistrate and becomes the constitutive element of  
the social assemblage of  courtship” (On Representation 67). The idea of  the “determined 
3. The novelist went on to develop an approach to the ethics of  sympathy in “The Lives of  the Animals,” chapters 
3 and 4 of  Elizabeth Costello.
4. The Magistrate is struck by the girl’s “ordinariness,” while acknowledging that “she may have ways of  finding me 
ordinary too” (56).
5. An echo of  the Biblical “stranger in a strange land” theme (Ex. 2: 22, and elsewhere). As belonging to a nomadic 
people, the girl could even be a type of  the wandering Jew, confronted with a totalitarian state of  which the Magistrate 
himself  is willy-nilly a representative. The Magistrate says to Colonel Joll, preparing to ride out against the barbarians: 
“You and I are strangers – you even more than I” (11). As the Magistrate quite sees, strangers are by definition strangers 
to each other. The girl is a stranger to him just as he, as the coloniser, is a stranger to her (in her land).
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function in the territorial assemblage” is interpretable as that of  a type, while the second 
half  of  Hamilton’s sentence provides an analogy of  person, although the language used 
is rather cold and tends to reification of  the person in both cases. Courtship would 
seem to turn the girl into a person. When she gets the chance to speak “the pidgin of  
the frontier” with other people she becomes “a witty, attractive young woman” (64) – a 
person, in fact, no longer the barbarian girl the Magistrate knows, or rather tries to get 
to know on his own terms. 
The Magistrate tries to break down the girl’s distance from him. Hamilton quotes 
Deleuze: “What is mine is first of  all my distance” (On Representation 65). The massage 
ritual is an attempt on the Magistrate’s part both at healing the girl from the wounds 
the Empire has inflicted on her, and at breaking down the distance he feels lies between 
them. But this proves impossible. The Magistrate does not allow the girl any distance, 
so that she has nothing that is fully hers. She is most fully herself  away from him, away 
from someone who reduces her identity to that of  a maimed victim of  state terror. The 
Magistrate only discovers this – apparently – “witty” side of  her shortly before parting 
from her forever. At the moment of  leave-taking he tries, as he already has done, “to 
understand who she really is” (73). But all he can see before him is “a stranger,” and 
there is nothing to suggest that that is all she sees before her: a stranger, too.
Personal Identity as Linked to Relationship:  
“I-Thou” as “primary word”
Yet we might examine the relationship between the Magistrate and the barbarian girl – 
a relationship which does, after all, form the heart of  the novel – from another stand-
point. This would involve setting aside the question of  masks as well as that of  the 
Magistrate’s preventing the girl from being herself. This would rest on a philosophical 
consideration of  personhood as linked to relationship. In an essay, the novelist explores 
Martin Buber’s idea that the “primary word” is not I but “I-Thou”: “This primal relation 
is, however, lost […]. Intimations of  the lost relation, [the] moments of  the Thou […], 
strange lyric and dramatic episodes, seductive and magical […] tearing us away to dan-
gerous extremes […] shattering security,” inspire our efforts to reconstitute again and 
again the being-with of  the primal I-Thou. The I searches for You: in Buber’s words, “If  
Thou is said, the I of  the combination I-Thou is said along with it” (in Doubling 72). Ac-
cording to Hubbeling, “the I-Thou relationship is very often numbered among the es-
sential relations of  a person. […] [I]t is plausible to say that a man cannot exist without 
at least some essential relations (to God and/or his fellow men) and that these relations 
belong to his essence. This ‘Thou’ can be interpreted in a threefold way: an individual 
Thou; a collective Thou of  a group (a political party, tribe, people, etc.); God” (Hub-
beling 9). With regard to the Magistrate, the barbarian girl is the “individual Thou”; his 
relationship to a “group” – the Empire for which he works – is broken off  by his guilt, 
in the eyes of  the Empire, in having consorted with a barbarian girl; and his relationship 
to God, if  he has one, cannot be discerned.6
The notion that the Magistrate and the barbarian girl share identity, up to a point, 
may be highlighted by the etymology of  the word “type” as deriving from the Latin 
6. Occasional Biblical references – “Truly, man was not made to live alone!” (80, clearly pointing to Gen. 2:18) – do 
not suffice to make of  the Magistrate a religious man. There are also some inconclusive allusions to prayer.
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typus, itself  related to the Greek tupos, meaning imprint. The state police torture both 
characters around the face and leave the same mark. The Magistrate examines the girl’s 
face: “I notice in the corner of  one eye a grayish puckering as though a caterpillar lay 
there with its head under her eyelid […]. The caterpillar comes to an end, decapitated, at 
the pink inner rim of  the eyelid. There is no other mark” (31). Later, the Magistrate has 
returned the girl to her people and has undergone torture: “The wound on my cheek 
[…] is swollen and inflamed. A crust like a fat caterpillar has formed on it. My left eye 
is a mere slit […]” (115). The Magistrate and the girl thus share the caterpillar as the 
residual trace of  their torture, and as a sign of  their irreducible otherness in relation to 
the Empire. The mark – the imprint – they share, confirms the link between them, but 
also the fact that in the eyes of  the Empire they are merely types. 
We close the novel after witnessing the man of  conscience as multiple above all: one 
might say, able to be multiple because of  his oneness, literally, his singularity, which is 
generated precisely by his being a man of  conscience. In fact, his own narrative attri-
butes to him a  carnivalesque variety of  identities. This alone would, on one level, make 
him a threat to the established order, even if  it is the established order which thrusts 
some of  these identities upon him. He is Magistrate, judge, One Just Man, old man, old 
woman (the police dress him in women’s clothing), a beast, a simple machine, a monkey 
forced to climb a tree, old clown, barbarian-lover, beggar, archaeologist. Personhood 
in the case of  the Magistrate is linked to marginalization: the Magistrate’s being mar-
ginalized (stripped of  his status and function, punished, tortured, imprisoned, publicly 
mocked) only serves to deprive him of  everything except what truly makes him a per-
son – his conscience. However, this argument itself  depends on one’s definition of  per-
sonhood: for Catherine McCall, “Persons are social beings, created and constituted, and 
found only in society […]. The individual can exist only as a person […]. The person 
is a public construction.” (Concepts of  Person 13-4). One approves the firmness of  this 
definition, but it leaves out the question discussed above, that of  interiority. In order to 
overcome this objection, with regard to Coetzee’s Magistrate at least, one might argue 
that the Magistrate is never a passive onlooker of  the barbarians’ plight: his conscience 
always prompts him to act. McCall’s definition can also be set against the attitude of  the 
men, other than the Magistrate, who accompany the barbarian girl back to her people: 
to the men, the Magistrate asserts, the barbarian girl is “a person of  no account” (80). 
This means she has no social identity, no place in society. She is no one. Despite her 
anonymity, she is not a person of  no account to the Magistrate. He identifies her in a 
world – the outpost – where she has no identity; or, if  he does not identify her, he tries 
to do so, in his own way. His own identity comes under pressure from his torture and 
imprisonment at the hands of  Empire: “I daily become more like a beast or a simple 
machine, a child’s spinning wheel, for example, with eight little figures presenting them-
selves on the rim: father, lover, horseman, thief…” (84-5). The Magistrate does not give 
“eight figures,” however, and somewhat changes the children’s rhyme which is usually, 
“Tinker, tailor, soldier, sailor, rich man, poor man, beggarman, thief…” The four terms 
chosen by the Magistrate apply to him (hence his careful and inventive choice). He is 
childless. But his relationship to the barbarian girl is, problematically, both that of  father 
– he acts as her protector – and lover. We witness him as rider, both when he hunts and 
when he takes the girl back to her people on horseback. Once stripped of  his dignity 
as Magistrate, he clearly resembles a beggar. Though he is not literally a thief, his rela-
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tionship with the barbarian girl is complex, and one might perceive him as trying to steal 
something from her – the secret, perhaps, of  her very identity. 
To be Human is to… Wait.
The multiplicity of  identities which the Magistrate attributes to himself  leads us, in 
conclusion, to explore the possibilities inherent in the verb in the novel’s title. The verb 
“to wait” (including the variant form “to await”) occurs in the novel about two dozen 
times. The title allows us to take the verb as ontological, definitional: it is the act of  
waiting that arguably defines identity. In the first chapter, we witness the Magistrate 
depicting his situation in metaphysical terms: on one of  his excursions two miles from 
his outpost where the Magistrate, as a hobby, excavates ruins he has found there, he says 
he was “opening [his] senses to the night, waiting for a sign that what lay around [him], 
what lay beneath [his] feet, was not only sand, the dust of  bones, flakes of  rust, shards, 
ash. The sign did not come” (16). Coetzee’s Dostoevsky is, as for him, “waiting for a 
sign,” when he hears a dog barking and takes it as somehow linked to his dead son Pavel: 
“He is waiting for a sign, and he is betting (there is no grander word he dare use) that 
the dog is not the sign, is not a sign at all, is just a dog among many dogs howling in the 
night. But he knows too that as long as he tries by cunning to distinguish things that are 
things from things that are signs he will not be saved” (Master 83). This dimension alone 
brings together the Magistrate and Coetzee’s later recreation of  Dostoevsky (along with 
the shared etymology of  magistrate and master). Beyond anonymity, person and type, 
the act of  waiting defines the Magistrate as a human being, since waiting is itself  a sign 
– a sign of  the incompleteness of  the human being. The “sign” is the equivalent of  the 
Magistrate’s “something”: “There is something staring me in the face, and still I do not 
see it” (155). The “sign” for which he is waiting, the “something” staring him in the 
face, may not be something, but rather – however tendentious it may seem – someone, 
an Other. And the Magistrate’s self-awareness may enable us to conclude that waiting in 
itself  is not a criterion of  humanness, since animals wait, too. It is the combination of  
waiting and knowing one is waiting which makes for humanness. Perhaps what ultima-
tely defines the Magistrate is his writerly identity in tandem with his waiting: he stares 
“at his empty white paper, waiting for words to come” (58). The text of  the novel, then, 
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